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Harmonizing the Antitrust Laws of
NAFTA Signatories
I. INTRODUCTION
The North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA")
took effect on January 1, 1994.1 Over a period of fourteen years,
the Agreement will abolish virtually all existing restrictions on
trade and investment among the three signatories: the United
States, Canada and Mexico.2 This, in turn, will create investment
opportunities, which will likely facilitate trade among the three
countries and remove barriers to future trade growth.3 For the
United States, easier access to the Mexican market presents
attractive business opportunities, as Mexico is currently the fastest
growing major export market for U.S. goods and services.
4
Additionally, NAFTA should ensure a more predictable business
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8, 11, 14 & 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-
Mex., art. 2203, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 289, 605, 702 (1993) (establishing January 1, 1994
as the effective date) [hereinafter NAFTA]. See generally NAFTA reprinted in 32 I.L.M.
at 289-456, 605-799. Due to its length, Articles 101 through 915 begin on page 289 while
Articles 1001-2206 begin on page 605.
2. Id., reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 289, 309-10 (presenting a schedule for tariff elimination
to be completed by January 1, 2008). See also Overview: The North American Free Trade
Agreement, (Aug. 1992) [hereinafter Overview], available in Westlaw, NAFTA Database;
Nancy Dunne, U.S. Seeks to Speed NAFTA Tariff Cuts, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1993, at 3.
3. Potential Impact on the U.S. Economy and Selected Industries of North American
Free Trade Agreement, USITC Pub. 2596, Inv. No. 332-37 (Jan. 1993) [hereinafter Potential
Impact], available in Westlaw, FINT-ITC Database.
4. Id. The United States has greatly increased trade under NAFTA, particularly in
the areas of computers, automatic data processing equipment, semiconductors, cathode ray
tubes for television, and agricultural equipment. United States is Exporting Wide Variety
of Products to Mexico Under Trade Pact, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA), at D-3 (Sept. 27, 1994),
available in Westlaw, BNA Library, BTD File (quoting Jeffrey R. Shafer, Assistant
Secretary for International Affairs at the U.S. Treasury). The United States is also selling
more cars because of the trade pact. Id. In the first five months of 1994, the United
States exported more than 12,380 passenger vehicles to Mexico. Id. This quantity is more
than 10% higher than the total for all of 1993, in which only 10,910 passenger vehicles
were sold. Id. Additionally, the value of consumer goods exported to Mexico reached
$2.7 billion for January through June of 1994, which represents an increase of more than
17% over 1993. Id. Overall, U.S. Exports to Mexico reached $28.7 billion for January
through July, an increase of 19% over the same period in 1993. Id.
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environment in Mexico, reducing the risks associated with
investment and other business decisions.
5
NAFTA's benefits are only attainable, however, in an open
and competitive marketplace, free from unfair competition
practices and monopolistic behavior. For this reason, it is
important to evaluate NAFTA provisions regarding antitrust law6
enforcement and to determine how anti-competitive conduct in the
free trade area might be curbed. Unlike the European Economic
Community, which possesses one body of antitrust law to which all
parties in the trade area subscribe, NAFTA signatories maintain
three separate domestic bodies of antitrust law. In order for the
NAFTA countries to compete in a single market without unfair
competition, they must either: (1) employ an effective resolution
mechanism for disputes arising from different antitrust approaches,
or (2) adopt a uniform antitrust approach.
After presenting the background of NAFTA in Part II, this
Comment reviews the Agreement's formal dispute resolution
process in Part III, emphasizing its specific exemption of dispute
resolution for competition disputes. With formal dispute resolu-
tion unavailable, fair competition under NAFTA may depend on
whether the antitrust approaches taken by the three signatories are
harmonious. Part IV compares the antitrust laws in each country
from a historical perspective and then analyzes recent develop-
ments in each country's laws. This Comment concludes that
Mexico and Canada have made deliberate efforts recently to
harmonize their antitrust approaches with the antitrust laws of the
United States. Most importantly, Mexico's recent legislation
indicates that the country is attempting to move away from a
history of monopolistic practices, protectionism, and inward-
looking trade policies toward a new era of open competition. This
trend toward harmonization reduces the likelihood of unfair
competition in the trade area and greatly enhances the likelihood
of NAFTA's success.
5. Potential Impact, supra note 3.
6. Throughout this Comment, "antitrust law" refers to both anti-monopoly laws and
competition laws.
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II. BACKGROUND OF NAFTA
Prior to NAFTA negotiations, there was an on-going econom-
ic integration underway in North America.7 After Canada and the
United States signed the Automotive Products Trade Agreement
in 1965,8 Mexican production facilities known as "maquiladoras"
began to form in northern Mexican cities to produce components
for the U.S. automobile industry.9 This initial integration was the
foundation for a trade relationship that lead to NAFTA negotia-
tions.'0
Several factors sparked the creation of NAFTA: (1) the
emergence of regional trading blocs by both the European
Community and East Asia, (2) the leap in trade volume between
Mexico and the United States, (3) the reforms that Mexico had
undertaken in recent years, (4) the success of the U.S.-Canada
Free Trade Agreement, and (5) the attractive prospects that
hemisphere-wide trade integration had presented to U.S. adminis-
trations in recent years."
On June 11, 1990, U.S. President George Bush and Mexican
President Carlos Salinas de Gortari agreed to negotiate a free
trade agreement between their countries.12 Soon after negotia-
tions began, Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney requested
that Canada also be included in the talks. 3 In June 1991, the
U.S. House of Representatives and Senate passed resolutions
7. GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, NORTH AMERICAN FREE
TRADE ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (1992).
8. Automotive Products Trade Agreement, Jan. 16, 1965, U.S.-Can., 17 U.S.T. 1372.
9. HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 7, at 3. Maquiladoras are offshore, light-
assembly factories that resemble airport hangars. They import components duty-free from
supplier nations, assemble them, and ship the finished products out of Mexico, paying duty
only on the value added. Many of the assembly plants are U.S. owned. See Mary
Williams Walsh, Mexican Factories Along the U.S. Border Succeed Despite the Criticism on
Both Sides, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 1985, available in Westlaw, WSJ Database.
10. HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 7, at 3.
11. The Year In Trade: Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, USITC Pub. 2554
(1991) [hereinafter The Year in Trade] (prepared in conformity with section 163(b) of the
Trade Act of 1974), available in Westlaw, FINT-ITC Database.
12. HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 7, at 1. See also Peter Truell, U.S., Mexican
Leaders Plan To Begin Formal Talks After December Meeting, WALL. ST. J., June 12,1990,
at A2.
13. PETER MORICI, TRADE TALKS WITH MEXICO: A TIME FOR REALISM 1 (1991).
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allowing fast track negotiations to begin. 4 Even before formal
talks began, the process of drafting NAFTA progressed from a
step-by-step approach of integrating the separate free trade
agreements between the countries15 to a full-blown trilateral
effort.' 6  In 1993, just three years after the process began, the
U.S. Congress passed the implementing bill,17 which took effect
on January 1, 1994.18
Under NAFTA, the United States, Canada, and Mexico
formed the largest free trading region in the global market with an
estimated 360 million consumers and $6 trillion in annual out-
put. 9  NAFTA simplifies access to the Mexican market-the
fastest growing major export market for U.S. goods and servic-
es---and spurs job creation, economic growth, and investment
opportunities." Most importantly, the Agreement creates a
strong alliance among the three countries that improves the
competitive stance of each country in the global market.' With
the emergence of competing trade alliances in the global market,
the pact among the United States, Canada, and Mexico is crucial
to each country's future economic stability and growth.'
Finally, NAFTA is expected to serve as the free trade model
for free trade agreements with other Latin American countries.24
Former President George Bush's Enterprise for the Americas
Initiative ("EAI") envisioned a series of such agreements serving
to broaden the trade area.' Trade pacts encompassing the
14. Id. Fast track authority was granted under the Omnibus Trade and Competitive-
ness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. § 2903 (1988).
15. When talks began, Canada and the United States had enacted the U.S.-Canada
Free Trade Agreement ("CFTA"). Mexico and the United States had, at that time, begun
to discuss a future free trade agreement between their two countries.
16. MORICI, supra note 13, at 1.
17. On November 17, 1993, the vote in the House of Representatives was 234 to 200
in favor of NAFTA. 139 CONG. REC. H10048 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1993). On November
20, 1993, the U.S. Senate approved the NAFTA implementing bill by a 61-38 margin. 139
CONG. REC. S16712 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1993). See also Trade Pact Clears by Margin 61-38,
Int'l Trade Daily (BNA), Nov. 23, 1993, available in LEXIS, BNA Library, ITD File.
18. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2203, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 289, 605, 702 (1993).
19. Overview, supra note 2.
20. Potential Impact, supra note 3.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. The Year in Trade, supra note 11.
25. Potential Impact, supra note 3.
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NAFTA partners and South America would form a powerful
hemisphere-wide trading unit.'
III. DISPUTE RESOLUTION UNDER NAFTA
In the past, Mexico's economic policies did little to invite
foreign business into its marketplace.27 Though Mexico offered
attractive natural advantages, such as a highly trainable, wage-
competitive workforce and a close proximity to the U.S. border,
Mexico's inward-looking and protectionist policies increased the
risk of doing business in Mexico.' Monopolies, collusion, and
corruption were the rule rather than the exception-a fact that
further deterred foreign businesses from trading and investing in
Mexico.29 Now, under NAFTA, U.S. and Canadian businesses
that may potentially invest in Mexico should consider what
protections the Agreement affords to avoid some of these
problems. These businesses should first examine the dispute
resolution mechanism available for competition or antitrust
disputes.
A. NAFTA's Formal Dispute Resolution Mechanism
According to NAFTA's dispute settlement provisions,'
parties who wish to submit a dispute for resolution must follow a
three-step process." First, the disputing parties must attempt to
settle the claim through consultation or negotiation.32 Second, if
the dispute is not resolved, one disputing investor must give
26. Id. In its effort to achieve this goal, the United States is planning to negotiate a
free trade agreement with Chile. U.S. May Be Ready to Negotiate a Free Trade Agreement
Within the Next Two Years, a U.S. Trade Representative Says, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA),
(Apr. 17, 1991), available in Westlaw, BNA-BTD Database. The Clinton administration
has not yet decided whether to pursue a bilateral free trade agreement with Chile or to
seek to negotiate its accession to NAFTA with Canada and Mexico. US. Reassures Chile
of Commitment to Free Trade Dea4 U.S. Officials Say, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) (Sept. 21,
1994), available in Westlaw, BNA-ITR Database.
27. 1 DOING BUSINESS IN MEXICO § 2.08 (Michael W. Gordon ed., 1992).
28. Id.
29. See Juanita Darling, Trade: Competition is Tough in Industries Where Monopolies
Still Exist, as One US. Entrepreneur Found Out, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1994, at D1; Tod
Robberson, NAFTA's Reality Rattles Mexico; Competition Spurs Violence, WASH. POST,
Aug 5, 1994, at A23; Tod Robberson, Mexico's Banking Afflicts Investors; Corruption Said
to Be Compounding Risk, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 1993, at A35.
30. NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 1115-1139, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 642-647.
31. Id. arts. 1118-1120, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 643.
32. Id. art. 1118, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 643.
1994]
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written notice to the other of his intent to submit a claim to
arbitration to the disputing party at least 90 days before the claim
is submitted." Third, after six months, if the claim is not explicit-
ly exempt under NAFTA,' a disputing investor may submit the
claim under any of the following arbitral agreements: (1) the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
("ICSID") Convention, provided that the disputing parties are
both parties to the convention;35 (2) the Additional Facility Rules
of ICSID, provided that one of the disputing parties, but not both,
is a party to the ICSID convention;' or (3) the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules.37 The dispute is then resolved by a panel of
three arbitrators, one appointed by each party and a third
arbitrator agreed upon by both parties.38
B. Competition Law Disputes Exempt from Formal Dispute
Resolution Mechanisms
While NAFTA provides a formal dispute resolution mecha-
nism for conflicts regarding monopolies and state enterprises, it
specifically exempts all other competition conflicts. 39 Because
33. Id. art. 1119, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 643. The notice requires the following
information: (a) The name and address of the disputing investors and, where a claim is
made under Article 1117, the name and address of the enterprise; (b) the provisions of the
Agreement alleged to have been breached and any other relevant provisions; (c) the issues
and the factual bases for the claim; and (d) the relief sought and the approximate amount
of damages claimed. Id. art. 1119(a)-(d).
34. Id. art. 1120(1), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 643.
35. Id. art. 1120(1)(a), reprinted in 32 LL.M. at 643. See also Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18,
1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (entered into force Oct. 14, 1966).
36. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1120(1)(b), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 643.
37. Id. art. 1120(1)(c), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 643. See also United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law, Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 81-93, U.N. Doc. A/40/17 (1985),
reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1302 (1985).
38. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1123, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 644.
39. Monopolies and state enterprises have access to the NAFTA dispute resolution
mechanism. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1117(1)(a)-(b), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 643.
Other competition disputes do not have access to the NAFTA dispute resolution
mechanism. Id. art. 1501(3), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 663. NAFTA's special treatment of
monopolies and state enterprises might be intended to reduce the risk of allowing them
to exist in the trade area. Monopolies and state enterprises are heavily disfavored under
U.S. and Canadian law. For a discussion of Domestic Antitrust Laws of United States,
Canada, and Mexico, see Part IV. Submitting disputes involving monopolies or state
enterprises to a formal resolution mechanism might be a way for Canada and the United
States to check Mexico's freedom to support its monopolies and state enterprises.
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one of the broad objectives specifically stated in NAFTA is to
"promote conditions of fair competition in the free trade area,
this exemption of competition disputes from the formal dispute
resolution mechanism is paradoxical. The exemption raises the
question: how can "fair competition" be enforced in the NAFTA
trade area, in light of the fact that each signatory has its own set
of competition laws with its own antitrust approach? The
remainder of article 1501 provides little guidance.
Article 1501(1) states that "[elach party shall adopt or
maintain measures to proscribe anti-competitive business conduct
and take appropriate action with respect thereto" and that "[t]o
this end, parties shall consult from time to time about the effective-
ness of measures undertaken by each party."41
Article 1501(2) states:
[E]ach party recognizes the importance of cooperation and
coordination among their authorities to further effective
competition law enforcement in the free trade area. The parties
shall cooperate on issues of competition law enforcement policy,
including mutual legal assistance, notification, consultation and
The NAFTA provision that permits state enterprises specifically provides that "[e]ach
party shall ensure, through regulatory control, administrative supervision or the application
of other measures, that any state enterprise that it maintains or establishes, acts in a
manner that is not inconsistent with the Party's obligations under [the Agreement]." Id.
art. 1503(2), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 663-64.
A similar provision exists with regard to monopolies. Id. art. 1502(3), reprinted in 32
I.L.M. at 633. The Agreement, however, imposes three additional rules on monopolies
that are not imposed on state enterprises. First, each monopoly must act "solely in
accordance with commercial considerations in its purchase or sale of the monopoly good
or service in the relevant market, including with respect to price, quality, availability,
marketability, transportation and other terms and conditions of purchase or sale." Id. art.
1502(3)(b), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 633. Second, each monopoly must provide "non-
discriminatory treatment to investments of investors, to goods and to service providers of
another Party in its purchase or sale of the monopoly good or service in the relevant
market." Id. art. 1502(3)(c), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 633. Third, each monopoly must not
"use its monopoly power to engage, either directly or indirectly, including dealings with
its parent, its subsidiary or other enterprise with common ownership, in anticompetitive
practices in a non-monopolized market in its territory that adversely affect an investment
of an investor of another Party, including through the discriminatory provision of the
monopoly good or service, cross-subsidization or predatory conduct." Id. art. 1502(3)(d),
reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 633.
40. Id. art. 102(1)(b), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 297.
41. Id. art. 1501(1), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 663 (emphasis added).
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exchange of information relating to the enforcement of competi-
tion laws and policies in the free trade area.42
In sum, NAFTA's competition law provisions leave substantial
gaps that could threaten the success of the Agreement. Specifical-
ly, NAFTA's express exemption of competition disputes from its
dispute resolution process, leaves the signatories with no formal
dispute resolution mechanism. As a result, the countries must rely
on the effectiveness of their consultations and cooperation.
The effectiveness of consultations and efforts to cooperate
could hinge on each country's willingness to employ a common
antitrust approach. Unlike the United States and Canada, which
share similar antitrust philosophies, Mexico had no effective
antitrust laws in force at the time the Agreement was drafted.43
Moreover, NAFTA does not require Mexico to ever adopt such
antitrust legislation.' At the time the Agreement was drafted,
therefore, the United States and Canada could only assume, in
good faith, that Mexico would eventually develop antitrust and
competition policies. Mexico did, in fact, begin developing
antitrust legislation in June 1993, shortly before the Agreement
took effect.45
42. Id. art. 1501(2), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 663 (emphasis added). Another
competition-related provision is the Agreement's establishment of a "Working Group on
Trade and Competition." Id. art. 1504, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 664. This group is
comprised of representatives of each signatory and make appropriate reports and
recommendations, to the Free Trade Commission on relevant issues concerning
competition laws, policies and trade in the free trade zone. Id.
43. Prior to the establishment of the Federal Competition Commission on June 23,
1993, Mexico did not have an antitrust enforcement agency. See CoMIsION FEDERAL DE
COMPETENCIA, ANNUAL REPORT 9-11 [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT]. As a result,
Mexico's constitutional prohibition of monopolies, which existed since 1857, went virtually
unenforced. See Government Explains Rationale, Program for Anti-monopoly Legislation,
Mexico Trade and L. Rep., Dec. 1, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, MTLR File
[hereinafter Government Explains Rationale]; ANNUAL REPORT at 15. According to the
Commission, "What is new in Mexico is the creation of specific provisions and procedures
that translate old concern with monopolies into concrete actions." ANNUAL REPORT at
41.
44. See generally NAFTA, supra note 1, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 289, 605.
45. For a discussion of the development and current status of Mexico's antitrust
policies, see Part IV.
[Vol. 17:157
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IV. DOMESTIC ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES,
CANADA, AND MEXICO
The threat of monopolies poses a special problem for those
doing business in Mexico, given the country's history of weak
antitrust enforcement and current problems stemming from the
response of Mexican businesses to increased competition under
NAFTA.46 One industry reporting problems is the dairy indus-
try.47 According to U.S. dairy company officials, "as Mexican
dairy farmers steadily lose control of once-safe markets ... they
are turning to violence."'  In one incident, unidentified men
poured gasoline onto a dairy truck bearing a U.S. logo and then
set it on fire.49 The owner of the truck claimed that his trucks'
tires had been punctured several times a week, prior to the arson,
and that some trucks had been hijacked."0 The hijacked trucks
were found in poor neighborhoods where residents claimed they
were told to take whatever milk they could find inside."1
In another incident, fifty men armed with rifles and clubs
invaded a dairy warehouse. 2 They held the workers at gunpoint
while they slashed open milk cartons bearing American labels. 3
The gunmen then "sprayed the warehouse with bullets" before
leaving.'
Another industry reporting problems is the soft-drink
industry.55 In a letter to Mickey Kantor, the U.S. Corn Refiners
Association claimed that Mexican sugar growers had threatened to
boycott the product of any domestic soft-drink producers who
switched from high-priced Mexican sugar to cheaper sugar,
imported from the United States.5 6 Coca-Cola was one of several
companies considering switching to the U.S. sugar in order to cut
costs.5 7 The U.S. Corn Refiners Association claimed that Coca-
46. Darling, supra note 29; Robberson, supra note 29.
47. Robberson, supra note 29.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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Cola did not switch because they were threatened with an all-out
boycott led by sugar industrialist Enrique C. Molina, the largest
bottler of Pepsi in Mexico.58
"The Mexican sugar industry, under the leadership of ...
Molina, has systematically visited other bottlers 'asking' them to
sign a written agreement not to use high-fructose corn syrup,"
the refiners association complained to Kantor. Any refusal to
sign means ostracism from domestic suppliers, they said,
"because no sugar mill will sell them sugar." 59
Another incident involved a telecommunications entrepreneur.
Brad Tirpak, a twenty-four year old graduate from Georgetown,
started Access Telecom, a profitable discount long distance service
in Mexico.' With an out-of-pocket investment of $3,000, he was
able to turn a profit of $2.5 million in the first year.61 Telephono
de Mexico ("Telmex"), a Mexican telephone monopoly, responded
to the competition by cutting Access Telecom's telephone wire and
terminating its business.62  "Tirpak's case is an exceptionally
blatant illustration of barriers that small- and medium-sized
companies may face if they try to carve a niche for themselves in
a Mexican market geared toward big corporations."'63 In the end,
Tirpack laid off his seven employees and returned to the United
States.' 4 Because Telmex is a legal monopoly under Mexican law,
it had the right to cut Tirpak's wires.65 Fortunately for entrepre-
neurs like Tirpak, Telmex's monopoly status will terminate in 1996,
opening up the market to free competition. 66
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Darling, supra note 29.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Article 28 of the Mexican Constitution forbids monopolies in principle, but
authorizes their existence "in cases of general interest," in order "to assure the efficiency
of the provision of services and the social utilization of goods." CONST. art. 28 (Mex.).
Until 1993, when Mexico adopted its new Federal Economic Competition Law, Mexico
had no comprehensive antitrust legislation comparable to that of either the United States
or Canada. The Federal Economic Competition Law has been characterized as a "wide
ranging attack on existing and future contraints on market forces." Government Explains
Rationale, supra note 43, available in LEXIS, News Library, MTLR File. See discussion
infra Parts IV.B.3 and IV.C.3.
66. Darling, supra note 29.
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Ruthless competition in Mexico still exists because competi-
tion law enforcement is relatively new in Mexico.67 Though
Mexico has prohibited monopolies for more than a century,' its
first enforcement agency, the Federal Competition Commission,69
is less than two years old. Entrepreneurs doing business in Mexico
could be up against a long-standing preference for monopolies,
which were permitted to exist under Mexico's protectionistic
policies.7 The effects of this past tradition could have a negative
effect on efficiency and fairness for years to come, especially if the
new Commission does not take an aggressive antitrust approach.7'
With the threat of monopolies hindering competition, and no
prospect for formal competition dispute resolution under the
Agreement, it is important to compare the antitrust philosophies
of each NAFTA country. It is especially important to consider the
direction in which each country's domestic antitrust laws are
moving. An examination of each country's history and current
trends in the area of antitrust enforcement provides insight into
whether harmonization of these domestic laws is likely.
A. Historical Roots of Antitrust Laws
1. United States
The U.S. antitrust laws have long recognized competition as
the driving force of the economy.' The word "antitrust" signifies
67. Mexico's first antitrust enforcement agency, the Federal Comptetition Commission,
was formed on June 23, 1993. Ley Federal de Competicia Econ6mica [Federal Law of
Economic Competition], D.O., Dec. 24, 1992 [hereinafter Federal Economic Competition
Law]. See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 43, at 5 (stating that the Federal Competition
Commission was created on June 23, 1993).
68. CONST. art. 28 (Mex.).
69. For a discussion of Mexico's Federal Competition Commission, see infra Parts
IV.B.3 and IV.C.3.
70. Darling, supra note 29; see also SIDNEY WEINTRAUB, FREE TRADE BETWEEN
MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES 91 (1985).
71. Darling, supra note 29; see also ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 43, at 14-15.
72. U.S. Senator John Sherman stated:
The popular mind is agitated with many problems that may disturb social order,
and among them all none is more threatening than the inequality of condition,
of wealth, and opportunity that has grown within a single generation out of the
concentration of capital into vast combinations to control production and trade
and to break down competition .... Congress alone can deal with them, and if
we are unwilling or unable there will soon be a trust for every production and a
master to fix the price for every necessity of life.
21 CONG. REc. 2,460 (1890) (emphasis added).
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opposition to the large trusts that began to develop after the Civil
War.73 Along with the large-scale enterprises that developed
during the war to meet military demands, came large amounts of
capital.74 This capital, combined with the entrepreneurial spirit
at the time, encouraged the creation of monopolies.75
The Sherman Antitrust Act of 189076 came into existence as
a result of public outrage aimed at these monopolies that threat-
ened competition.77 Two key provisions of the Sherman Act
forbid monopolizing and combinations in restraint of trade.78
Section 1 of the Sherman Act states: "[e]very contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations is hereby declared to be illegal., 79  Section 2 of
the Sherman Act states: "Every person who shall monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other
person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall
be deemed guilty of a felony" '
Sherman further stated that, "[t]he sole object of [trusts] is to make competition
impossible." Id. at 2,457 (emphasis added).
73. JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN & GEORGE J. SIEDEL, THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT OF
BUSINEss 524 (1989).. Sherman defined trusts as "a new form of combination" that "seeks
to avoid competition by combining the controlling corporations, partnerships, and
individuals engaged in the same business, and placing the power and property of the
combination under the government of a few individuals, and often under the control of a
single man called a trustee, a chairman, or a president." 21 CONG. REC. 2,457 (1890).
74. LIEBERMAN & SIEDEL, supra note 73, at 524.
75. Id. at 524-25.
76. Sherman Antitrust Act §§ 1-8, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1890).
77. In Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), Chief Justice White
explained the purpose behind the Sherman antitrust legislation:
[T]he main cause which led to the legislation was the thought that it was required
by the economic condition of the times, that is the vast accumulation of wealth
in the hands of corporations and individuals ... and that combinations known as
trusts were being multiplied, and the widespread impression that their power had
been and would be exerted to oppress individuals and injure the public generally.
Id. at 50.
78. The U.S. Supreme Court articulated these prohibitions in Standard Oil:
[Clontracts or acts which it was considered had a monopolistic tendency,
especially those which were thought to unduly diminish competition and hence
to enhance prices--in other words, to monopolize--came also in a generic sense
to be spoken of and treated as they had been in England, as resticting the due
course of trade, and therefore as being in restraint of trade.
Id. at 61.
79. 15 U.S.C. § 1,
80. Id. § 2.
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U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice White distinguished these
provisions in the landmark case, Standard Oil Co. v. United States:
[Hiaving by the first section forbidden all means of monopoliz-
ing trade, that is, unduly restraining it by means of every
contract, combination, etc., the second section seeks, if possible,
to make the prohibitions of the act all the more complete and
perfect by embracing all attempts to reach the end prohibited
by the first section, that is restraints of trade, by any attempt to
monopolize, or monopolization thereof, even although the acts
by which such results are attempted to be brought about or are
brought about be not embraced within the general enumeration
of the first section.81
Cases since Standard Oil maintain the goal of protecting
competition. In Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States,' the Court
said:
[T]he Sherman Act was aimed at preserving free and unfettered
competition as the rule of trade. It rests on the premise that
the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the
best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the
highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the
same time providing an environment conducive to the preserva-
tion of our democratic, political and social institutions.. . [T]he
policy unequivocally laid down by the Act is competition.8
3
In United States v. Nat'l Soc. of Prof Engineers,s4 the Su-
preme Court reiterated the long-standing value of competition and
further stated, "[e]ven assuming occasional exceptions to the
presumed consequences of competition, the statutory policy
precludes inquiry into the question whether competition is good or
bad.
,,as
In 1914, Congress passed two additional antitrust laws, the
Clayton Act' and the Federal Trade Commission Act.' Within
the jurisdiction of the Clayton Act are specific practices such as
81. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 61.
82. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
83. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
84. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
85. Id. at 695.
86. §§ 1-20, 15 U.S.C. § 12-27 (1914). The Clayton Act supplemented existing laws
against unlawful restraints and monopolies. Id. pmbl., § 12.
87. §§ 1-25, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-51 (1914). The Federal Trade Commmission Act created
a Federal Trade Commission and defined the Commission's powers and duties. Id. pmbl.,
§ 41.
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price discrimination, 8 exclusive dealing contracts,89 tying ar-
rangements,' acquisition of a company's competitors,9' and
interlocking directorates.' The Federal Trade Commission Act,
on the other hand, is less specific. It outlaws, in general, "unfair
methods"' of competition and also establishes the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC")' as an independent agency to assist the
U.S. Department of Justice in enforcing antitrust lawsY.
The Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade
Commission Act remain the bases of antitrust law.' Over the
years, many states have adopted similar laws to supplement and
provide additional protection against anticompetitive practices.'
Most of these laws are modeled after the federal laws.98
2. Canada
Canada and the United States share a similar antitrust
background. Canadian antitrust legislation was first introduced in
1889 when the Canadian Parliament passed an act prohibiting "all
conspiracies, combinations, and agreements, which had the effect
of unduly limiting competition in trade or production." 99  The
Canadian legislation was similar to the Sherman Act adopted in
the United States one year later.1 o Canada's legislation was
88. Clayton Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 13.
89. Id. § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14.
90. Id.
91. Id. § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18.
92. Id. § 8,15 U.S.C. § 19.
93. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45. Section 5(a)(1) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act states that "[ujnfair methods of competition in or affecting
commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practice in or affecting commerce are hereby
declared unlawful." Id. § 5(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1). "The standard of 'unfairness'
under the FTC Act is, by necessity, an elusive one, encompassing not only practices that
violate the Sherman Act and the other antitrust laws . . . but also practices that the
Commission determines are against public policy for other reasons." Federal Trade
Comm'n v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 454 (1986).
94. Federal Trade Commission Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 41.
95. Id.
96. LAWRENCE ANTHONY SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 13 (1977).
97. LIEBERMAN & SIEDEL, supra note 73, at 524-26 (1989).
98. Id.
99. GORDON KAISER, COMPETITION LAW OF CANADA § 1.01 (1988) (citing An Act
for the Prevention and Suppression of Combinations Formed in Restraint of Trade, S.C.,
ch. 41 (1889) (Can.)).
100. Id. For a comparison of the Canadian legislation with the Sherman Act, see supra
notes 72-98 and accompanying text.
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designed to provide a mechanism for investigation into trusts and
monopolies that may potentially be contrary to public interest.1°1
The 1889 Act was codified in the criminal code in 1892. In 1960,
the legislation was consolidated into the Combines Investigation
Act.' 2
As in the United States, trusts and combinations began to
form in Canada, which required regulation by antitrust legisla-
tion.0 3 Both Canada and the United States pursued the com-
mon goal of protecting competition."° Despite these similarities,
there was a significant difference between the U.S. and Canadian
antitrust legislation; the Canadian legislation was enforced
primarily through the criminal courts."5 As a result of the high
burden of proof in criminal cases, the "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard, the legislation proved to be ineffective.' °6  In
response, the Canadian Legislature enacted the Competition Act
of 1986.1°7
The Canadian legislature was motivated by four factors in
enacting the Competition Act: (1) Canada's merger and monopoly
laws had become ineffective and obsolete, (2) various enforcement
procedures under the Combines Investigation Act had been
challenged and declared invalid, (3) the Combines Investigation
Act was a criminal statute that, according to the federal govern-
ment, could not adequately address matters of economic conduct
and structure,108 and (4) several Canadian Supreme Court
decisions had resulted in unexpected interpretations of the
Act.1 9
With the enactment of the Competition Act and the Competi-
tion Tribunal Act"0 in June 1986, the Canadian Parliament
101. KAISER, supra note 99, § 1.01.
102. See Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C., ch. C-23 (1970) (Can.) (amended and
superseded by the Competititon Act, S.C., ch. 26 (1986) (Can.)). The 1986 amendment
repealed the name "Combines Investigation Act" and replaced it with "Competition Act."
S.C., ch. 26, Pt. II, § 19 (1986) (Can.).
103. KAISER, supra note 99, § 1.01.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. S.C., ch. 26 (1986) (Can.).
108. KAISER, supra note 99, § 14.02. This inadequacy was due to the criminal burden
of proof and the lack of expertise existing in the Criminal Court system. Id. The new
Competition Tribunal was designed to remedy this particular problem. Id.
109. Id.
110. S.C., ch. 26 (1986) (Can.).
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fundamentally reformed the law. Instead of a prosecutorial
criminal court system, the legislation created a new regulatory
system based on the federal power to regulate trade and com-
merce."' Currently, the law applies to both criminal and civil
violations, as in the United States."2 Under the Competition
Act, there is a current trend in Canada toward a compliance-
oriented approach similar to that of the United States.
113
3. Mexico
Unlike Canada and the United States, Mexico does not have
a history of antitrust law enforcement. Traditionally, Mexico's
competition laws have been protectionist and inward-looking." 4
As Mexico's newly-formed Competition Commission115 explains:
For many years, the Mexican economy operated in an environ-
ment of substantial protection and strong State participation.
As a consequence, opportunistic behavior emerged in many
sectors, often with the cooperation of the authorities. The
belief was that protection and regulation would produce a
strong industrial sector responsive to society's needs."6
Mexicans did not expect the government to leave the determi-
nation of the overall course and pattern of economic development
to private policy-makers." 7 They entrusted the Mexican govern-
ment with, and expected it to play, a significant role in managing
the economy."8 The Mexican government was expected to
protect Mexicans from foreign economic domination and to ensure
fairness."9 The new Federal Competition Commission described
the results of this protection:
111. KAISER, supra note 99, § 1.01.
112. Id.
113. Id. See generally Ian Nielson-Jones, Canadian Antitrust Enforcement, 57
ANTITRUST L. J. 923 (1989).
114. Terry Wu & Neil Longley, A U.S. Mexico Free Trade Agreement: U.S. Perspectives,
J. WORLD TRADE, June 1990, at 5-6. See also SIDNEY WEINTRAUB, FREE TRADE
BETWEEN MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES 91 (1985). See generally ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 43, at 14.
115. For a discussion of Mexico's new antitrust legislation and Federal Competition
Commission, see infra Parts IV.B.3 and IV.C.3.
116. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 43, at 14. See also Alejandro Junco, The Americas:
The Case for an Internal Mexican Free-Trade Agreement, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 1991, at
A9.
117. MORICI, supra note 13, at 20.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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Protection reduced firms' competitive abilities and harmed
consumers. Regulations were inadequate as they created
artifical barriers to the entry of new competitors, and resulted
in a sometimes ambiguous legal framework, a factor which
contributed to the formation of monopolies."2
The Mexican economic environment has not only allowed, but
encouraged, the existence of monopolies.121 Although Article 28
of the Mexican Constitution provides that "there shall be no
monopolies or restrictions to free competition (estancos) of any
kind," the prohibition applied in only limited circumstances.2
The limited circumstances included the elimination of the follow-
ing: (1) agreements to artificially maintain price, (2) arrangements
limiting competition in industries, (3) price discrimination, and (4)
refusals to supply.'23
"Since the mid-1980's, Mexico has achieved progress in
opening up its economy to international competition."124 These
measures increased the role of private parties in economic
management and removed barriers to the efficient allocation of
resources."2 The reforms have paved the way for Mexico's first
aggressive antitrust legislation, the Federal Economic Competition
Law, which established its first antitrust enforcement agency, the
Federal Competition Commission.26
The new Federal Competition Commission describes the
recent reforms in Mexico as follows:
Mexico is undergoing far-reaching changes in its economic
strategy. The State's role in the economy has been reformed,
and distortions that hindered efficient market operations have
been eliminated. The revision of the regulatory framework in
which economic activity takes place led to the repeal and
120. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 43, at 14.
121. Id. See generally MORIci, supra note 13.
122. CONST. art. 28 (Mex.); see also GISBERT H. FLANZ & LOUISE MORENO, MEXICO,
reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 32 (1988).
123. CONST. art. 28 (Mex.)State enterprises run by the government are also excluded
from the definition of monopolies. Id.; see also FLANZ & MORENO, supra note 122, at 32.
State enterprises include such industries as the coinage of money, the postal system, the
telegraph, radiotelegraphy and satellite communication, federal banking, petroleum and
other hydrocarbons, basic petroleum chemistry, radioactive minerals, nuclear power
production, electricity, and railroads. FLANZ & MORENO, supra note 122, at 32.
124. FLANZ & MORENO, supra note 122, at 32.
125. Id.
126. Federal Economic Competition Law, supra note 67.
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modification of laws and regulations which limited the initiative
and activity of producers and consumers.127
Finally, the Commission has set the following two broad
objectives to guide Mexico's change in strategy: (1) "to set the
foundations of a modem market economy that can generate
sustained growth in the medium term" and (2) "to redefine the
State's role in the economy so that it may assist more effectively
those that are most in need.""
B. Current Antitrust Laws Pertaining to Restraint of Trade
and Monopolies
1. United States
Section 1 of the Sherman Act states: "Every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations is hereby declared to be illegal., 129  Though
section 1 literally prohibits every contract, combination, or
conspiracy in restraint of trade, the prohibition has long been
confined to "only such concerted activity as reasonably restrains
trade.'
130
In determining what activities reasonably restrain trade, the
court considers several factors. First, it must define the market, as
comprised of geographical and product specifications, in which the
company under investigation does business."' Second, the court
must determine if the company has power within that market, as
defined by market share and consumer product differentiation.'32
Once these two threshold determinations have been made, the
court can engage in a balancing test required under the "rule of
127. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 43, at 9.
128. Id.
129. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
130. Graphic Prod. Distrib. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1566 (11th Cir. 1983); see also
Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 31 (1911).
131. Itek, 717 F.2d at 1569.
132. Id. at 1570.
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reason." 13 3  "Per se rules of illegality are appropriate only when
they relate to conduct that is manifestly anticompetitive."
' 34
The balancing test is used to determine whether the compa-
ny's actions hurt rather than help competition.1 35  This determi-
nation requires the courts to identify and weigh the anti-competi-
tive aspects of the company's action or practice against the pro-
competitive aspects in order to determine the overall effect on
competition. If the company's actions have an overall anti-
competitive effect, with due consideration given to legitimate
business reasons or economic rationale, it has violated the
Sherman Antitrust Act under the rule of reason test.
The broad-ranging inquiry required by the rule of reason is
limited by an insistence that, at the threshold, the plaintiff establish
the defendant's market power.136  Once this threshold is crossed,
a systematic comparison of the negative effects of the actions is
required.1 37 "In order to establish the defendant's market power,
a plaintiff must first offer proof of a well-defined relevant market
upon which the challenged anticompetitive actions would have had
a substantial impact.' 13  The next step, therefore, is to deter-
133. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36,47 (1977) (overruling the
"per se" rule stated in United States v. Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967)). Under the
rule of reason, the ultimate legality rests on whether the plaintiff has demonstrated an
anticompetitive effect that is not offset by a need to achieve a procompetitive benefit or
justification. Id. See also Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231,238 (1918);
Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 62 (adopting the rule of reason).
134. Continental TV., 433 U.S. at 49-50. See also Abrams v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 811
F. Supp. 848, 869 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). "[A] per se rule is applied when 'the practice facially
appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and
decrease output."' Nat'l Collegiate Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100 (1984)
(stating that "[i]n such circumstances a restraint is presumed unreasonable without inquiry
into the particular market context in which it was found.").
135. General Leaseways, Inc. v. Nat'l Truck Leasing Ass'n, 744 F.2d 588, 596 (7th Cir.
1984) (emphasis added).
136. See Graphic Prod. Distrib. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1568 (11th Cir. 1983). But
see Federal Trade Comm'n v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447,460 (1986) (applying
the rule of reason test and concluding that a finding of actual, sustained adverse effects in
the dental services market was legally sufficient to support finding of unreasonable
restraint, even in absence of market elaborate analysis); Nat'l Collegiate Ass'n, 468 U.S.
at 86 (applying rule of reason test and holding that "[as] a matter of law, the absence of
proof of market power does not justify a naked restriction on price or output," and that
"when there is an agreement not to compete in terms of or output, 'no elaborate industry
analysis is required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such an agreement."').
137. Itek, 717 F.2d at 1571.
138. Id. at 1569. See also Abrams, 811 F. Supp. at 848. "A relevant market is
comprised of those 'commodities reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same
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mine whether the company is a market power in the relevant
market.
"Market power is the ability to raise prices significantly above
the competitive level without losing all of one's business.'
'1 39
Because market power is conceptually difficult to define in any
given case, two criteria are used to measure it: (1) market share
and (2) product differentiation." In determining market share,
however, the amount of market share required to establish market
power is ambiguous.
Several cases have attempted to define the amount of market
share required for market power. In American Tobacco Co. v.
United States,141 the Supreme Court found that "over two thirds
of the entire domestic field of cigarettes and over eighty percent
of the field of comparable cigarettes" constituted a "substantial
monopoly. 142  In United States v. Grinnell Corp.,43 the Su-
preme Court held that an eighty-seven percent market share
constituted monopoly power. The Supreme Court has also held
that an eighty to ninety-five percent market share is sufficient
enough indication of monopoly power to withstand summary
judgment.'" In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,
145
the court found 90% of market constituted a monopoly. Finally,
in Graphic Prods. Distrib. v. Itek Corp.,'46 the court found that
a seventy to seventy-five percent market share of the relevant
market constituted market power. Thus, there is some ambiguity
as to the amount of market share required to indicate monopoly
power.
The court also examines product differentiation because,
where it exists, "a company will have additional freedom to raise
the price of its product above that of competing brands while still
purposes ....... United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395
(1956).
139. Itek, 717 F.2d at 1570 (quoting Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678
F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 1982)).
140. Id. See also Storer Cable Communications, Inc. v. Montgomery, 826 F. Supp. 1338,
1351 n.15 (M.D. Ala. 1993).
141. 328 U.S. 787 (1946).
142. Id. at 797.
143. 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966).
144. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Serv., Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2076
(1991).
145. 148 F.2d 416, 429 (1945).
146. See Graphic Prod. Distrib. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1570 (11th Cir. 1983)
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retaining a substantial portion of business." '147 Thus, where there
is strong product differentiation, significant market power may
exist without market dominance.1" If it is possible that the
defendant has the power to substantially restrain trade, the inquiry
proceeds to the question of whether the challenged practice is
likely-with due consideration for any justifications presented by
the defendant-to help rather than hurt competition. 9 As the
Itek court pointed out, vertical restraint on trade, 50 for example,
involves some reduction in intrabrand competition, almost by
definition."5 This may or may not, however, have a negative
impact on interbrand competition152 "The real issue remains
whether the loss of intrabrand competition itself injures or benefits
potential consumers of the brand in question." '53 The restraint
injures consumers if they are denied intrabrand choices from which
they would benefit, without obtaining more services through
interbrand competition)54
The complete analysis, therefore, requires a balancing of the
company's business and economic purposes against possible
unreasonable effects. The burden of proving unreasonable effects
lies with the antitrust plaintiff.155  Nevertheless, the plaintiff is
not required to offer every possible pro-competitive rationale for
a vertical restraint, and prove their inapplicability to the restraint
in question. 56
In analyzing the defendant's reasons for its seemingly
anticompetitive behavior, the court considers: (1) the condition of
the business before and after the restraint was imposed, (2) the
nature of the restraint and whether its effect is actual or probable,
147. Id. at 1570 n.15.
148. Id.
149. See General Leaseways, Inc. v. Nat'l Truck Leasing Ass'n, 744 F.2d 588, 596 (7th
Cir. 1984); Itek, 717 F.2d at 1571.
150. "Vertical restraints are agreements between firms at different levels of the chain
of distribution, ranging from the original supplier of basic compenents to the retailer who
sells the finished product to the ultimate consumer." STEPHEN F. Ross, PRINCIPLES OF
ANTITRUST 224 (1993)
151. Itek, 717 F.2d at 1571.
152. See Continental, Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55
(1977) (listing the positive effects that restricting intra-brand competition might have on
interbrand competition).
153. Itek, 717 F.2d at 1571.
154. Id. See also Storer Cable Communications, 826 F. Supp. at 1351.
155. Itek, 717 F.2d at 1573.
156. Id.
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(3) the history of the restraint, and (4) the evil believed to exist by
imposing the restraint.5 7 Furthermore, the plaintiff's arguments
can be supported by evidence of anticompetitive intent on the part
of the company.
58
Section 2 of the Sherman Act states: "Every person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony."'59  The U.S. Su-
preme Court defines monopoly power as "the power to control
market prices or exclude competition."'16  A Section 2 offense
has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the
relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of
that power as distinguished from growth or development resulting
from legitimate means.
161
In enforcing section 2 of the Sherman Act, the courts do not
assume, per se, that all monopolies are harmful. 162 Rather, the
courts seek out only those companies that have become monopo-
lists through illegitimate means, or that, after becoming a monopo-
list, act illegitimately to maintain power163
2. Canada
The Competition Act of 1986 completely changed Canada's
prior monopoly laws."6 Prior to the enactment of the Competi-
tion Act, the Combines Investigation Act governed antitrust
violations and provided: "Every person who is a party or privy to
or knowingly assists in, or in the formation of, a merger or
monopoly is guilty of an indictable offense and liable to imprison-
ment for a term not exceeding two years."' 65
157. Id. at 1568.
158. Id. at 1573 (holding that evidence of anticompetitive intent is highly probative, not
because good intention will save otherwise objectionable regulation, but because
knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and predict consequences).
159. Id. § 2.
160. United States v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1966).
161. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). Legitimate means
include: a superior product, business acumen, and historical accident. Id. at 571.
162. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 272-73 (2d Cir. 1979).
163. Id. Unlike in criminal cases, specific intent to monopolize is not required in civil
cases.
164. See generally Competition Act, S.C., ch. 26 (1986) (Can.).
165. Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C., ch. C-23, art. 1 (1985) (Can.).
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The Combines Investigation Act presented two main problems
for the Canadian judiciary that were eradicated by the new
Competition Act. First, the criminal burden of proof placed a
"high onus on the Crown. ' 66 Second, the need to prove that a
monopoly operated to the detriment of the public proved to be a
difficult hurdle for the prosecution. 67
Under the Competition Act, monopolization has been termed
"abuse of a dominant position."'16  As in the United States,
monopolization is adjudicated in a civil proceeding under the
jurisdiction of the Competition Tribunal. 69
Under the Act, the Tribunal must make three basic findings
before ordering an anti-competitive practice to cease."7  First,
the Tribunal must find that one or more persons substantially or
completely control the class of business."' 1 Second, the person
or persons must have engaged in the anti-competitive practice.172
Third, the anti-competitive practice must have, or be likely to
have, the effect of preventing or substantially lessening competition
in a market.
173
In Eddy Match Co. v. The Queen,74 the Quebec Court of
Appeal defined control as:
[W]hen a group of companies engage in the same business or
alone in the field; when they work together as units; when they
are free to supply the market or to withhold their market; when
there is no restriction on the prices which they charge, save
their own self interest; when their freedom to exclude individu-
als' customers is restricted only by their interpretation of
existing penal laws, then by all normal standards, those compa-
nies are in control of the business in which they are en-
gaged.
175
If the Tribunal finds that the defendant substantially or
completely controls the class of business, then the inquiry proceeds
166. KAISER, supra note 99, § 9A.01.
167. Id.
168. Competition Act, S.C., ch. 26 (1986) (Can.). See also Warren Grover & Robert
Kwinter, The New Competition Act, 66 CAN. Bus. REV. 267, 287 (1987).
169. Competition Act, S.C., ch. 26 (1986) (Can.).
170. Competition Act, S.C., ch. 26, §§ 51(a)-(c) (1986) (Can.).
171. Id. § 51(a).
172. Id. § 51(b).
173. Id. § 51(c).
174. 18 C.R. 357; 109 C.C.C. 1; 20 C.P.R. 107 (1953) (Can.).
175. Grover & Kwinter, supra note 168, at 287.
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to whether the defendant firm engaged in an anti-competitive
act.'76 This raises the question: what is an anti-competitive act?
The new legislation provides examples of anti-competitive acts
to guide the Tribunal. 177 The list includes the following acts: the
squeezing of margins,178 acquisition of a competitor's supplier or
a competitor's customer,179  freight equalization,"s  fighting
brands, 181 preemption of scarce resources, l"2 buying up prod-
ucts to prevent falling prices, adoption of incompatible product
specifications, l8 3 inducing a supplier not to sell,1" and selling
articles below cost.t8 5 The list provided in the Act is not exhaus-
tive. The examples provided, however, indicate that prohibited
practices include anti-competitive intent or purpose."8
The final prong of the inquiry requires that "the abuse must
have, or be likely to have, the effect of substantially lessening
competition in a market."'187 It is unclear what the Tribunal
seeks to achieve in the third prong of the analysis. "Once the
Tribunal has found 'dominance,' which by definition posits a
market completely or substantially devoid of competition, and a
176. Id.
177. Competition Act, S.C., ch. 26. §§ 50(a)-(i) (1986) (Can.).
178. Id. § 50(a). This squeezing of margins occurs in vertically integrated industries
with dual distribution systems. An integrated supplier can squeeze the margin available
to an unintegrated customer who competes with the supplier. Grover & Kwinter, supra
note 168, at 289-91.
179. Competition Act, S.C., ch. 26, § 50(b) (1986) (Can.). This is done through
acquisition of a customer or supplier who would otherwise be available to a competitor.
Id.
180. Id. § 50(c). Freight equalization occurs when a dominant firm may automatically
match a competitor's price regardless of freight charges. This negates the advantage a
small firm may have in terms of proximity to the market. Grover & Kwinter, supra note
168, at 291-92.
181. Competition Act, S.C., ch. 26, § 50(d) (1986) (Can.). Fighting brands is the use
of selective, regional or temporary brands to discipline or keep customers out. Grover &
Kwinter, supra note 168, at 294-95.
182. Competition Act, S.C., ch. 26, § 50(e) (1986) (Can.). Preemption of scarce
resource is the practice of cutting off the source of supplies for potential entrants. Grover
& Kwinter, supra note 168, at 295.
183. Competition Act, S.C., ch. 26, § 50(g) (1986) (Can.). In some industries, product
standards are essential for distribution. The adoption of unique standards by a dominant
firm can forestall competition. Grover & Kwinter, supra note 168, at 296.
184. Competition Act, S.C., ch. 26, § 50(h) (1986) (Can.). A dominant firm may use
its purchasing power to coerce a supplier to cut off supply to a competitor. Grover &
Kwinter, supra note 168, at 296-97.
185. Competition Act, S.C., ch. 26, § 50(i) (1986) (Can.).
186. Grover & Kwinter, supra note 168, at 288-89.
187. Id. at 297.
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practice of anti-competitive acts, it is unclear what additional
relevance the 'substantial lessening of competition' factor could
have to the Tribunal's determination as to the existence of abusive
conduct."'
In making an order regarding abuse of a dominant position,
the Tribunal must also consider whether the practice is the result
of superior competitive performance. 8 9  Where the Tribunal
finds that the anti-competitive practice has had, or is having, the
effect of preventing or "lessening competition substantially" in a
market, and that additional measures are required to restore
competition, it may direct the involved parties to take such actions
"as reasonable and necessary to overcome the effects of the
practice in that market."'"
3. Mexico
Mexico has restructured its economy and effectuated substan-
tial liberal economic reforms.'91 These reforms have included
privatization of state-owned enterprises, significant reductions in
maximum tariff rates, elimination of restrictive licenses on
imported goods, and the encouragement of foreign investment and
ownership of Mexican firms."9  Also, the Mexican legislature
enacted additional antitrust measures to streamline the NAFTA
transition and to minimize potential trade disputes.93
In December 1992, Mexican President Salinas de Gortari
signed and enacted the Federal Law Governing Economic
Competition."l Modeled after antitrust laws in the United
States, Mexico's Federal Economic Competition Law is enforced
188. Id.
189. Competition Act, S.C., ch. 26, § 51(4) (1986) (Can.).
190. Id. § 51(2).
191. See generally COMISION FEDERAL DE COMPETENCIA, REGULATORY REFORM AND
COMPETITION POLICY: SETTING THE INCENTIVES FOR AN EFFICIENT ECONOMY (1994).
The brochure describes the reforms taking place in Mexico and introduces Mexico's new
Federal Law on Economic Competition, which is enforced by the newly-created Federal
Competition Commission. Id.
192. Wu & Longley, supra note 114, at 6.
193. Federal Economic Competition Law, supra note 67.
194. Id. On November 26, 1992, President Carlos Salinas de Gortari sent the Chamber
of Deputies a legislative initiative "to promote domestic and foreign competition by
forbidding the creation of monopolies." Economic News & Analysis on Mexico, December
2, 1992, reprinted in LEXIS, Nsamer Library, Mexico File. In December 1992, the
[Chamber of Deputies] approved the Federal Law of Economic Competition. The law
became effective in July 1993. Federal Economic Competition Law, supra note 67.
1994]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. [Vol. 17:157
by the Federal Competition Commission. It sets regulations
regarding competition, mergers, acquisitions, and purchases of
Mexican companies.'95
In 1993, the first year of its existence, the Commission kept a
low profile."9 Although the Commission was intended to break
up cartels, the law failed to accomplish this goal throughout
1993.1' The main problems facing the Commission included lack
of experience and lack of resources.'98 The Mexican agency had
a full-time staff of only fifteen and no clearly defined budget.' 99
The Commission appears to be far more successful during the
first half of 1994, however, as indicated by its first annual report,
which details the reforms and decisions it has made since its
origination."°° United States antitrust enforcement officials are
praising the new laws and have demonstrated faith that the nation
has taken steps to prevent a repeat of the problems encountered
in the past.2 '
As in the United States and Canada, Mexico's new antitrust
approach is aimed at protecting competition.' Article 2 of the
195. Changes in Mexican Law Anticipate Approval of NAFTA, Attorneys Say, Int'l
Trade Daily (BNA), (Apr. 15, 1993) available in LEXIS BNA Library, BNAITD File.
196. Janet Duncan, Mexico Monopoly Buster Says Agency Profile to Rise, Reuters, July
5, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
197. Jonathan D. Glater, Busting Trusts South of the Border-Latin Countries Take
Antitrust Lessons from U.S. to Open Markets, WASH. PoST, Aug. 21, 1993, at B1.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 43, at 10-11. In its first annual report, the
Commission discusses its first steps taken "to improve economic efficiency and increase
social welfare." Id. at 10. The Commission investigated the bank credit card market to
prevent possible anticompetitive conduct on the part of financial institutions regarding the
setting of merchant commissions and interest rates. Id. The investigation resulted in a
consent agreement with the main financial institutions sponsoring the Banamex, Bancomer,
and Carnet credit cards. Id. The agreement allows merchants to individually negotiate
commissions with each acquiring bank and grant comsumers discounts for payments in
cash. Id. Each bank will also individually set the interest rate to cardholders. Id. The
Commission also investigated the rules for operating and opening gasoline stations. Id.
As a result, the Commission signed a consent agreement with Petr6leos Mexicanos that
will "increase the number of gasoline stations and improve their geographical distribution
according to market requirements." Id. The consent agreement also allows gasoline
station operators to offer their own choice of complementary products or services, from
any supplier. Id.
201. Chief of Antitrust Division Commends Mexico's New Competition Law, Int'l
Business & Finance Daily (BNA) (Mar. 30, 1993), available in LEXIS, Nsamer Library,
ALLNSA File.
202. Federal Economic Competition Law, supra note 67, ch. 1, art. 2. See also Antitrust
and Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1606, at 299 (Mar. 18, 1993) available in LEXIS, BNA
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Federal Competition Act strives to safeguard the Mexican
consumers by "protecting the process of competition" in Mexican
markets. 3 The purpose of Article 2 is "to protect the process
of competition and free market participation, through the preven-
tion of monopolies, monopolistic practices and other restraints on
the efficient operation of goods and services markets." 2
As in the United States and Canada, the new Mexican
approach toward monopolies depends on the type of practice being
examined. The Mexican law bans horizontal restrictive action
deemed to be "absolute monopolistic practices" such as price
fixing, production and distribution restrictions, market division and
concerted bidding in public tenders.' 5 Absolute monopolies will
be severely sanctioned and monopolistic contracts will have no
legal force.2 6 This rule is similar to the "per se" rule of illegality
employed in the United States. 7  "[R]elative monopolistic
practices" like resale price maintenance, tied purchases, exclusivity
contracts, refusals to deal and boycotts may be permissible,
depending on their effect.2°  Mexico's approach to relative
monopolies is similar to the United States' approach under the
rule of reason.'t Such actions are prohibited only if a company
Library, TRADRG File.
203. Federal Economic Competition Law, supra note 67, ch. 1, art. 2.
204. Id.
205. Id. Absolute monopolistic practices are contracts, agreements, arrangements, or
cartels of economic agents competing among themselves, whose aim or effect is any of the
following: (1) to lower, raise, fix, or manipulate the sale or purchase price of goods or
services at which they are supplied or demanded on the market, or the exchange of
information that has the same purpose or effect; (2) to establish an obligation not to
produce, process, distribute, or market but a restricted or limited amount of goods or a
restricted or limited type, volume, or frequency of service; (3) to divide, distribute, assign,
or impose portions or segments of a present or potential market of goods and services, on
the basis of certain customers, suppliers, time, or space, or those to be determined; or (4)
to establish, rig, or coordinate bids, or to abstain from submitting proposals in tender
competitions or bidding in public auctions. Id. ch. 2, art. 9.
206. Id. ch. 2, art. 9.
207. For a discussion of the "per se" rule, see supra note 134 and accompanying text.
208. Federal Economic Competition Law, supra note 67, ch. 2, art. 10. "Relative
monopolistic practices are considered to be those acts, contracts, agreements or cartels,
whose purpose or effect is or could be to wrongfully displace other agents from the
market, substantially impede their access thereto or to establish exclusive advantages in
favor of one or several entities .... " Id.
209. For a discussion of the "rule of reason," see supra note 133 and accompanying
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has substantial power over the relevant market and such power has
the effect of restraining competition.210
In determining the relevant market, the Commission considers
the following factors: (1) the possibility and feasibility of product
substitution, (2) the cost of product distribution, (3) the cost and
probability of users or consumers seeking other markets, and (4)
federal, local or international restrictions that limit access by users
or consumers to alternate sources of supply or the access by
suppliers to alternate customers.
21
Whether a company has "substantial" market power is
determined on a case-by-case investigation based on the following
criteria: (1) the firm's market participation and its ability to
unilaterally fix prices without competitors being able to counteract,
(2) the presence of barriers to market access, (3) the existence and
market power of competitors, (4) the access of the company and
its competitors to input and other raw materials, and (5) recent
market performance.212
One commentator compared the Competition Commission's
analysis of relative monopolies to a series of filters that serve to
separate true monopolistic practices from those that encourage
efficiency and are therefore legal.213
In the first step or filter, the commission receives a complaint
and begins a study of the relevant market. If the commission
finds that the problems exist only in a small sector of the
market, the case will be dismissed. For example, if a good
trades internationally, and the domestic price in Mexico does
not systematically differ from the international price, it is
improbable that a monopoly exists.
214
If the Competition Commission determines that a price
differential exists, indicating a monopoly, the Commission
"investigates the responsible parties in the market" in the second
filter.215 The case will be dismissed if the investigation reveals
that the responsible parties have insufficient power to monopolize
210. Federal Economic Competition Law, supra note 67, ch. 2, art. 11.
211. Id. ch. 2, art. 12.
212. Id. ch. 2, art. 13.
213. Joel Russell, New Monopoly Law Limits Anti-Competitive Practices; A Level
Playing Field, Bus. MEx., Aug. 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
214. Id.
215. Id.
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the market.2 6 If the case is dismissed, the practice in question
may continue.2"7 Otherwise, the case proceeds to the third
filter.218
In the third filter, the Commission analyzes the effect of the
practice on competition.2 9 "The Commission will follow consis-
tent procedures and decision-making processes, but will not use
statistical "rules" to determine the presence of a monopoly.""2
Two specific provisions of the Economic Competition Law are
being praised by the U.S. Department of Justice. 22  Article 14
of the Act provides that any act of a Mexican State Government,
which is intended to "prohibit the entry or exit from its territory
of goods or services of domestic or foreign origin," shall have no
legal force. 2  Article 15 of the Act further provides further that
the Competition Commission has the authority to determine that
or whether such trade restraining acts by state governments
exist. 3  These Articles are not included in the United States
antitrust laws and are viewed by the U.S. Justice Department as an
improvement over U.S. law.224
There is some criticism, however, regarding the extent to
which the new laws will be applied. The law will not apply to
federal agencies such as the postal service and the state-run oil
company PEMEX.? One prediction is that the law may not
have much impact on giant companies such as Vitro, Cemex, and
Televisa. 2  Mexico needs big companies to compete in the
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Chief of Antitrust Division Commends Mexico's New Competition Law, Int'l
Business & Finance Daily (BNA) (Mar. 30, 1993), available in LEXIS, Nsamer Library,
ALLNSA File.
222. Federal Economic Competition Law, supra note 67, ch. 2, art. 14.
223. Id. ch. 2, art. 15.
224. Chief of Antitrust Division Commends Mexico's New Competition Law, Int'l
Business & Finance Daily (BNA) (Mar. 30, 1993), available in LEXIS, Nsamer Library,
ALLNSA File.
225. Id.
226. Monopoly players in Mexico include: Aerovias de Mexico, which controls
Aeromexico and Mexicana (1992 airline sales of $1 billion); Cementos Mexicanos (1992
cement sales of $2.2 billion); Vitro (1992 glass sales of $3.3 billion); Petroleos Mexicanos
(1992 oil and gas sales of $21.3 billion); Ferrocarriles Nacionales de Mexico (1992 railway
sales total not available); Transportacion Maritima Mexicana (1992 shipping sales of $.4
billion); Telefonos de Mexico (1992 telephone sales of $6.7 billion); Televisa (1992
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international arena, and the government is not going to weaken
them because it would make it easier for foreign companies to
seize their markets. 1 7 One commentor explains: "[mionopolies
and monopolistic practices have long existed in Mexico and long
been ignored by the authorities. Under the previous monopoly
law, which dated from 1934, only one law suit was ever brought to
Mexican courts. Even today, many key industries are dominated
by a single player that overshadows competitors. '
C. Current Antitrust Laws Pertaining to Mergers
1. United States
Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 9 the companies planning
mergers or acquisitions must submit advance notification to the
U.S. Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"). 3  The FrC then
reviews the potential merger or acquisition to determine if it might
violate the Clayton or FTC Acts."' If appropriate, the FTC then
may bring an enforcement action to stop or modify the nature of
the plan. 2
The FTC's merger analysis consists of two main steps that are
similar to the monopoly approach. First, it defines the relevant
market in terms of product and geography. 3  Then, the FTC
analyzes the merger to determine if it substantially lessens
competition.' The main difference between the monopoly
analysis and the merger analysis is the relevant market definition.
In the merger analysis, the FTC can consider the effects of the
merger in any relevant geographic market, regardless of how broad
television sales of $ 1.4 billion). Monopoly Rules: Effects of the New Antitrust Law May
Not be Clear, Business Latin America (Oct. 4, 1993), available in LEXIS, Nsamer Library,
Mexico File.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15(c)-(h), 18(a), 66 (1988).
230. 15 U.S.C. § 18(a).
231. 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1988).
232. 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (1988).
233. Abrams v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 811 F. Supp. 848, 866 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
234. California v. American Stores Co., 872 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1988). The court held:
"[tlo establish a prima facie violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act, California must
prove that the effect of the American Store's acquisition of Lucky's stock 'may be
substantially to lessen competition."' Id. at 841 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 18).
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or how narrow; whereas, in the monopoly analysis the FTC only
considers the broader relevant geographic market.2 5
The seminal case in defining the market for merger analysis
purposes is United States v. Brown Shoe.' In Brown Shoe, the
Supreme Court held that the outer boundaries of broad markets
"are determined by the reasonable interchangeability of use or
cross-elasticity of demand between the product itself and substi-
tutes for it,"2" but that narrower "well-defined submarkets"
might also be appropriate lines of commerce.8 By defining the
relevant product market as narrowly as the narrowest submarket,
and by defining the relevant geographic market as any area of the
country affected, the FTC can focus on the smallest market
possible when assessing the effect of a merger or acquisition.
In Brown Shoe, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's
finding that men's, women's, and children's shoes made up
separate submarkets.2 9  The Supreme Court established the
following indicia for identifying areas of actual or potential
competition: (1) industry and public recognition of the submarket
as a separate economic entity, (2) the product's peculiar character-
istics and uses, (3) unique production facilities, (4) distinct
customers, (5) distinct prices, (6) sensitivity to price changes, and
(7) specialized vendors.24
In Brown Shoe, the Supreme Court relied on the presence of
separate manufacturing facilities, public recognition of separate
submarkets, the peculiar characteristics of each type of shoe, and
distinct customer groups.241 The court found that these factors
were economically significant in identifying actual fields of
competition simply because men do not normally buy women's or
children's shoes for their own use, and women and children exhibit
parallel purchasing habits regarding shoes made for their respec-
tive groups. This natural barrier insulated sales of each of the
235. Section 7 of the Clayton Act refers to "any line of commerce ... in any section
of the country" 15 U.S.C. § 18 (emphasis added).
236. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
237. 1d at 324.
238. Id. at 325.
239. Id. at 326.
240. Id. at 325.
241. United States v. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. 294, 326 (1962).
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three types of shoes from competition with the others and justified
their division into separate submarkets.
242
An example analysis is the merger case of California v.
American Stores Co.243 The court had to determine which
relevant product market encompassed supermarkets. The
defendant, American Stores, argued that the market should not be
limited to supermarkets2 but rather should include "all retailers
of grocery products, such as convenience stores, "mom and pop"
grocery stores, gasoline stations, delis, bakeries, and limited
assortment warehouse hyper-stores." 5 According to the defen-
dant, consumers readily engage in demand substitution between
different types of grocery retailers. By broadening the market
definition, American Stores had a better chance of proceeding with
the planned merger, because the anti-competitive effects of such
a merger are quite significant in smaller markets due to fewer
competitors.
The court, however, accepted the plaintiff's view that the
relevant product market was limited to supermarkets: full-line
grocery stores with more than 10,000 square feet.2' The district
court reasoned that only supermarkets compete for consumers'
periodic grocery shopping needs. In reaching its decision, the
court relied on expert testimony and on American Stores' own
internal marketing documents, which suggested that it considered
other supermarkets to be its only competitors.247 The Ninth
Circuit expressed reservation, however, as to whether, under
independent review, it would reach the same conclusion regarding
relevant product market.2' The court postponed ultimate
determination of the issue because its review in American Stores
required strong deference to the trial court. This case illustrates
the uncertainty that exists in the United States regarding the
definition of markets. As is often the case in the submarket
analysis, an economic debate occurs.
242. Thurman Industries, Inc. v. Pay 'n Pak Stores, Inc., 875 F.2d 1369, 1375 (9th Cir.
1989).
243. 812 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1988).
244. Id. at 841.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. 812 F.2d at 843.
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Another example of this uncertainty can be found in Thurman
Industries v. Pay 'N Pak Stores, Inc. 24 9 In Thurman, the Ninth
Circuit expressed some reservation in finding a submarket to
exist250 just two months after American Stores. The Thurman
court refused to find that "home center stores" constituted a
submarket.25 Thurman argued that home center stores consti-
tuted a discrete product market because of their broad selection of
building, plumbing, and electrical supplies for home remodeling
projects and their trained sales staffs. Thurman maintained that
the unique combination of goods and services allows do-it-yourself
remodelers and home repairers to obtain "everything they need at
one location." 252
The goods and services that sellers or producers offer provide
the best indicia of who competes in the same market. Thus, a
product market is typically defined to include the pool of goods
or services that qualify as economic substitutes because they
enjoy reasonable interchangeability of use and cross-elasticity of
demand.253
The court admitted, however, that the product market could be
narrowed further to account for identifiable submarkets and
product clusters.254
Despite its recognition that submarkets and product clusters
do, in fact, exist, the Thurman court found that the market could
not be defined so narrowly for home centers.255 The court was
swayed by "Pay 'N Pak's evidence that for any given product sold
at a home center, a functionally equivalent or identical product is
available for purchase at several more specialized stores" through-
out the relevant geographic area.56 Pay 'N Pak also presented
evidence that consumers were quite sensitive to price fluctuations
among the various vendors for any given product.257 The court
stated that Thurman could not contradict this evidence and that it
249. 875 F.2d 1369 (9th Cir. 1989).
250. Id.
251. Id. at 1374.
252. Id. at 1373.
253. Id. at 1374.
254. 875 F.2d at 1374.
255. Id. at 1374.
256. Id.
257. Id.
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erroneously placed its reliance on a submarket or product cluster
theory.25a
Another factor the FTC considers in analyzing the effect of a
merger or acquisition is the barriers to entry. That is because an
absence of entry barriers into a market constrains anticompetitive
conduct, regardless of the market's degree of concentration. 259
In evaluating the absence of entry barriers, the Court considers the
following factors: (1) amount of capital necessary to become a
competitor in the market, (2) availability of capital, (3) availability
of technological advancements, (4) number and size of customers
or firms already operating in the market, and (5) structure and
nature of industry. 2
2. Canada
As in the United States, the Canadian Parliament's intention
is to not regard mergers as necessarily good or bad, but rather to
consider the likely impact of each merger individually. The
Canadian Tribunal hopes to eliminate any merger that "prevents
or lessens, or is likely to prevent or lessen, competition substantial-
ly.' 261  This approach closely resembles the approach taken in
the United States under Section 7 of the Clayton Act.2 2 The
similar wording of the Canadian and U.S. merger laws, then,
allows for development of complimentary case law in the United
States and Canada.263
In defining markets for Canadian purposes, one can find
guidance in the statutory factors that the Tribunal utilizes to
determine whether or not a merger is likely to lessen competition
substantially.' The list includes: (1) the extent to which foreign
competitors could provide effective competition to the businesses
of the parties to the merger, 5 (2) whether the business of a
party to the merger is likely to fail,26 (3) the extent to which
258. Id.
259. California v. American Stores Co., 872 F.2d 837, 843 (9th Cir. 1989).
260. Id. (recognizing the factors as established in FTC v. Warner Communications, Inc.,
742 F.2d 1156, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 1984)).
261. Competition Act, S.C., ch. 26, § 64(1) (1986) (Can.). See also Grover & Kwinter,
supra note 168, at 273.
262. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
263. See generally Nielson-Jones, supra note 113.
264. Competition Act, S.C., ch. 26, §§ 65(a)-(h) (1986) (Can.).
265. Id. § 65(a).
266. Id. § 65(b).
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acceptable substitutes for products supplied by the parties to the
merger are likely to be available, 67 (4) barriers to entry,2" (5)
the extent to which effective competition could remain in a market
that could be affected by the merger,269 (6) the likelihood that
the merger could result in the removal of a vigorous and effective
competitor,2 70 (7) the nature and extent of change and innovation
in a relevant market,27' and (8) any other factor relevant to
competition in an affected market.272
The Canadian approach rejects U.S. assumptions such as the
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI), used by the U.S. Justice
Department to simplify the identification of mergers that may pose
a threat to competition due to high market share concentra-
tion.273 The Competition Act provides: "The Tribunal shall not
find that a merger or proposed merger prevents or lessens ...
competition substantially solely on the basis of evidence of
concentration or market share."274 In the Canadian context, the
list of factors included in the Competition Act ensures that no
presumptions based on a Canadianized HHI will arise.275 In
addition, the Act recognizes a limited "gains in efficiency" defense
where the merger is likely to result in gains in efficiency that will
be greater than any adverse effect on competition resulting from
the merger. 76
The Tribunal considers two factors to determine if the "gains
in efficiency" defense might apply: (1) a significant increase in the
real value of exports, or (2) a significant substitution of domestic
products for imported products.'7  The Act cautions, however,
267. Id. § 65(c). This provision invites the Tribunal to consider products to which
buyers might turn in response to a price increase in the principal product. Grover &
Kwinter, supra note 167, at 273.
268. Competition Act, S.C., ch. 26, § 65(d) (1986) (Can.).
269. Id. § 65(e).
270. Id. § 65(f).
271. Id. § 65(g).
272. Id. § 65(h).
273. The HHI measures the sum of the area of the market share of each firm in the
market. The Department of Justice 1984 Guideline promoted the use of this index and
established the HHI as the threshold that will normally govern the Department's response
to any particular merger. See generally United States Dep't. of Justice Merger Guidelines
§ 1.51 (1992), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 13,104 (Apr. 7, 1992).
274. Competition Act, S.C., ch. 26, § 64(2) (1986) (Can.).
275. Id. § 65.
276. Id. § 68(1).
277. Id. §§ 68(a)-(b).
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that the Tribunal "shall not find that a merger or proposed merger
has brought about, or is likely to bring about, gains in efficiency by
reason only of redistribution of income between two persons.
278
As in the United States, the pertinent market identification,
in terms of both product and geography, is central to the merger
analysis. 279  In fact, Canada employs a market definition ap-
proach similar to Brown Shoe. "The outward boundaries of the
market expand or contract as emphasis is given to factors such as
product substitutability and the possible influence of actual or
potential mergers where the merging entities are in direct
competition at the same level of business within an industry."
Mergers are divided into three categories and subject to
different competitive concerns. This is important because the type
of merger will dictate the test used to determine the merger's
impact. The three types of mergers are: "horizontal," which
applies to directly competing firms; "vertical," which applies to
buyer-seller mergers; and "conglomerate," which usually describes
mergers that are neither horizontal nor vertical. 1  As in the
United States, once the market definition threshold is crossed, the
next step is to apply the impact test.
Where the United States and Canada differ in their merger
analyses is with regard to the test used for horizontal mergers.
Basically, the United States views such mergers as possessing the
greatest threat to consumers. Canada, on the other hand, takes a
less presumptive approach:
On the good side, mergers may be an important means by
which owners who wish to divest themselves of a business can
do so with a minimum of disruptive economic effects. They
may also be the most appropriate means of achieving certain
cost savings or bringing about industrial reorganizations made
necessary by changes in patterns of demand or in the technical
conditions of production.'
As with horizontal mergers, Canada also takes an approach
similar to the United States with respect to to vertical mergers, yet
there are slight differences. In the 1984 Merger Guidelines, the
278. Id. § 68(3).
279. See generally Nielson-Jones, supra note 113.
280. Id.
281. Grover & Kwinter, supra note 168, at 273.
282. Id.
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United States elevates the significance of entry barriers above
market foreclosure to competitors. 83  The approach set out in
the Guidelines may be useful to Canadian lawyers attempting to
convince the Director not to act, but the U.S. court decisions are
only persuasive for little more than interpretation of the stat-
ute.284
In sum, Canada and the United States certainly take similar
approaches under merger laws. The most significant difference
appears to be the Canadian rejection of statistical assumptions and
the U.S. strict presumption that horizontal mergers threaten
consumers. The strenuousness that the United States chooses to
utilize in enforcing its antitrust laws, however, often depends on
the administration in place at the time.'
3. Mexico
The mergers and acquisitions analysis has been the area most
affected by the new competition law in Mexico.' When refer-
ring to mergers, the Federal Economic Competition Law also
includes the term "trusts" 287 A trust, or merger, is "the acquisi-
tion of control, or any other act, whereby companies . . . are
concentrated among competitors, suppliers, distributors or any
other economic agents. '
As in the United States and Canada, there is a notification
requirement in Mexico for mergers.8 Since June 1993, large
mergers cannot be completed until the Federal Competition
Commission has been informed.2' Notification is required if the
283. Id. at 279.
284. Id. at 280.
285. See generally William E. Kovacic, Reagan's Judicial Appointees and Antitrust in the
1990s, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. 49 (1991). Kovacic argues that the federal antitrust system
gives federal judges considerable discretion with which to determine the rules of
competition. He concludes that "[in choosing federal judges, the Reagan/Bush appointees
have adhered to conservative antitrust preferences more frequently than their Carter
counterparts." See also Robert S. Stein, INVESTOR'S BUSINESS DAILY, Sept. 8, 1993,
available in LEXIS, BNA Library, IBD File. Stein contrasts the different different
philosophies of the Reagan and Clinton administrations and argues that "there are few
areas where President Clinton will have greater opportunity to reverse President Reagan's
legacy than in antitrust." Id.
286. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 43, at 11.
287. Federal Economic Competition Law, supra note 67, ch. 3, art. 16.
288. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 43, at 17.
289. Federal Economic Competition Law, supra note 67, ch. 3, art. 20.
290. Id.
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transaction: (1) has a value of more than 12 million times the
Mexico City minimum wage,29' (2) if the deal involves the
accumulation of thirty-five percent or more of the equity in a
company with assets or sales greater than $55 million,2 2 or (3)
if the negotiation includes two or more agents whose combined
annual sales exceed $220 million and involves an equity interest of
more than $22 million.293
Furthermore, corporations should notify the relevant authori-
ties in anticipation of any transaction in Canada, the United States,
Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and most nations in the European
Community.294 The Commission will generally have forty-five
calendar days after notification to approve the merger.295 Be-
cause the time limits are similar to the laws in other countries,
Mexican mergers and acquisitions should not be hampered by a
slow administrative process.296
The Commission challenges and penalizes those trusts that
have the purpose or effect to "diminish, impair or impede
competition and free market participation in regard to equal,
similar or substantially related goods or services.' ' 297 As in the
United States, the Commission considers the relevant market and
the market power of the economic agents in that market.
298
The relevant market is defined by grouping goods or services
that can substitute for each other, in terms of use and price. For
this purpose, the Commission takes into consideration product
characteristics, their geographic location and the ease of access
to the product and its substitutes.
299
After defining the relevant market, the Commission applies
"concentration indices" to determine whether market concentra-
tion is significant." If the merger in the relevant market is not
significant, the Commission does not challenge the merger. If the
291. Id. ch. 3, art. 20 (I).
292. Id. ch. 3, art. 20 (II).
293. Id. ch. 3, art. 20 (III).
294. Id. ch. 3, art. 21 (11).
295. Id. ch. 3, art. 21 (111). The mean response time was 27 days, as of June 1994.
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 43, at 17.
296. Joel Russell, New Monopoly Law Limits Anti-Competitive Practices; A Level
Playing Field, Bus. MEX., Aug. 1993, available in LEXIS, Nsamer Library, Mexico File.
297. Federal Economic Competition Law, supra note 67, ch. 3, art. 16.
298. Id. ch. 3, art. 18.
299. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 43, at 27.
300. Id.
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merger in the relevant market is significant, but the Commission
does not find any substantial power and it is not feasible to obtain
such power as a consequence of the merger, the Commission does
not challenge it either. If there is significant market concentration,
the Commission determines whether the party or parties would
acquire "substantial power" in the relevant market, by virtue of
the 301the transaction.
3°
The Commission considers the following factors in determin-
ing whether the merger impairs or impedes competition: (1) the
merger allows the merging party to unilaterally fix prices or
substantially restrict the stock or supply on the relevant market,
without competitors able at present or potentially to offset the
power; (2) actual or possible intent, on the part of the merger's
beneficient, to wrongfully displace other economic agents or
prevent their access to the relevant market; and (3) the merger
substantially facilitates monopolistic practices.'
If as a result of its investigation, it is apparant that the trust
impairs or impedes competition, the Commission may impose
penalties. 3  In addition, the Commision may: (1) make the
merger contingent upon compliance with conditions or (2) order
a partial or total breaking up of the trust which has been wrongful-
ly created.3' 4
In compliance with the new merger law, the Commission
received fifty-two notifications, of which forty-five had been
decided as of June 1994.0 Of the forty-five decided cases,
thirty-nine were approved as filed.3° In the remaining cases, the
Commission challenged the merger or imposed conditions on the
merging parties to eliminate the possible anticompetitive effects of
the transaction.
V. CONCLUSION
Several factors existed at the time NAFTA was drafted that
could have undermined the success of the Agreement. First, the
301. Id.
302. Federal Economic Competition Law, supra note 67, ch. 3, art. 17.
303. Id. ch. 3, art. 19.
304. Id.
305. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 43, at 17.
306. Id.
307. Id. For a discussion of specific merger cases, see id., supra note 43, at 17-29.
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Agreement did not employ a common body of antitrust law to
which each signatory would subscribe. Second, Mexico did not
have any effective antitrust laws at the time. The Agreement does
not even require Mexico to adopt antitrust legislation in the future.
Third, though the United States and Canada shared a similar
antitrust tradition, their antitrust approaches still differed in many
ways. The differences among the three countries' antitrust laws
and antitrust law enforcement could have caused disputes.
Most importantly, the Agreement specifically exempts
competition disputes from formal dispute resolution procedures.
Under NAFTA, competition dispute resolution depends on the
success of consultations between disputing signatories and their
efforts to cooperate. Effective consultation and cooperation could,
in turn, hinge on whether the countries share similar antitrust
philosophies.
These factors could have undermined the success of the
Agreement. Instead, the countries appear committed to achieving
the NAFTA's primary goal-to promote conditions of fair
competition in the free trade area. To this end, Mexico has taken
revolutionary steps.
Mexico's Federal Economic Competition Law represents the
country's dramatic break with its history of protectionism and state
participation. The new law, modeled after U.S. antitrust laws,
signifies Mexico's committment to achieving a more efficient and
equitable trade environment. The law transforms the Mexican
government's role in the economy and seeks to eliminate
hinderences to efficient market operations. The effects of the new
law might not be realized immediately, however, due to the long-
lasting effects that Mexico's past monopolistic practices will likely
have for many years to come.
Nevertheless, Mexico is striving to set the foundations of a
modern market economy. Its new law promotes equity and
opportunity in the free trade area. The Commission's actions since
its inception indicate a strong commitment to its new antitrust
philosophy. This committment, along with continued harmoni-
zation of U.S., Canadian, and Mexican antitrust laws, is critical to
NAFTA's success.
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